INTRODUCTION
Shortly after midnight on 6 August 2011, a Chinook helicopter carrying NATO and Afghan security forces was preparing to land near the Tangi Valley in Afghanistan. As the helicopter was descending, a Taliban fighter fired a rocketpropelled grenade (RPG) 1 at the dangerously exposed aircraft. The helicopter burst into flames, breaking apart as it plummeted to the ground. Thirty-eight people died in the crash, including 22 US special forces troops, making it the deadliest single incident of the war for US forces (King, Dilanian, and Cloud, 2011; Riechmann, 2011 ). An unclassified summary of a US military investigation into the incident confirms that the helicopter was hit by a 'rocket-propelled grenade' but provides no additional details (US CENTCOM, 2011b) .
Most media accounts also refer to the weapon simply as a 'rocket-propelled grenade', 2 but there are many kinds of RPGs from various sources and with very different capabilities. These differences matter-and not just in the case of the downed helicopter. Whether Taliban arsenals are filled with 30-year-old Soviet PG-7 rounds or PG-29V rounds for the deadly RPG-29 Vampir has profound implications, yet detailed data on illicit weapons in Afghanistan is scant.
These data gaps are not limited to Afghanistan. Details on the model, country of origin, age, and condition of illicit weapons are rare, and the little information that is available is usually anecdotal and incomplete. Thus, we are left to wonder what models of RPGs and other weapons are most readily available to terrorists, insurgents, and criminals. How technologically advanced are these weapons? Is it possible to keep them out of the hands of individuals and groups that are likely to misuse them? How old are they, and how many are still functional? Answers to these questions have the potential to shape efforts to stem the flow of illicit weapons and shed light on the threat they now pose. This chapter inaugurates a multi-year project to provide such answers through data-driven analysis of illicit small arms and light weapons worldwide.
The project consists of three overlapping phases. This chapter distils the findings of the first phase, focusing on 'war weapons', namely small arms and light weapons illicitly acquired and used by non-state actors in high-intensity conflict zones. Phase two will look at illicit small arms in low-intensity armed conflicts and in countries affected by high-intensity organized criminal violence. The third and final phase will examine countries affected primarily by individual criminal violence.
To date, the project has collected and analysed data on 80,000 illicit small arms and light weapons in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia, making it the largest study of its kind. While the scope, specificity, and comprehensiveness of the data vary considerably from country to country, overall the data sheds new light on illicit weapons in war zones, confirming some common assumptions and challenging others. The main findings from this first phase of the project include:
• The vast majority of illicit small arms in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia appear to be Kalashnikov-pattern assault rifles. 3 Other types of small arms are comparatively rare.
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• Most illicit light weapons and light weapons ammunition studied appear to be versions of Soviet-and Chinesedesigned weapons first fielded decades ago.
• Data compiled for this study suggests that armed groups in Afghanistan and Iraq have access to very few technologically sophisticated or latest-generation light weapons.
• Newly acquired data on weapons seized in Iraq suggests that a significant percentage of seized Iranian weapons were manufactured recently.
• Despite the large quantities of small arms and light weapons that are trafficked into Somalia, the variety of available items is limited.
The chapter begins by defining key terms and concepts. A brief overview of the data used in the study is then provided. Illicit small arms and light weapons in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia are then assessed in more depth. The chapter concludes with additional observations about 'war weapons'.
USE OF TERMS
For the purposes of this chapter, 'illicit small arms and light weapons' are weapons that are produced, transferred, held, or used in violation of national or international law. The chapter uses the term 'illicit' rather than 'illegal' to include cases of unclear or contested legality. As detailed below, the term 'small arms and light weapons' is used in accordance with established Small Arms Survey practices, with some minor modifications. In this chapter, the term 'small arms' (alternatively, 'firearms') refers to the following items:
• revolvers and self-loading pistols;
• rifles and carbines;
• shotguns;
• sub-machine guns; and
• light and heavy machine guns.
The term 'light weapons' is used to refer to the following items:
• mortar systems of calibres of 120 mm or less;
• hand-held, under-barrel, and automatic grenade launchers;
• recoilless guns;
• landmines;
• portable rocket launchers, including rockets fired from single-shot, disposable launch tubes;
• portable missiles and launchers, namely anti-tank guided weapons (ATGWs) and man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS); and
• improvised explosive devices (IEDs).
This list includes some items not typically thought of as light weapons, including improvised explosive devices and mortars of calibres of 100 mm to 120 mm. 4 Since it is not possible to separate fully data on heavy machine guns-Most of the data, which was obtained directly from the US military, identifies the model and country of manufacture of the seized weapons. The data also distinguishes 'caches' from 'explosive remnants of war' and 'post-invasion' from 'pre-invasion' caches; that is, caches assembled before and after March 2003.
• The Defense Video & Imagery Distribution System. Funded by the US Army, this information aggregation service contains thousands of media releases summarizing the contents of seized caches in Afghanistan and Iraq.
It is among the largest public sources of data on seized caches and accounts for most of the caches analysed for this study. While it is significantly better than most other publicly available information, the collected data is not perfect. The sample of seized caches in Iraq is not random, although any selection biases are at least partially mitigated by the size of the sample and the diverse nature of the seized caches. The data also reflects the US military's apparent tendency to inspect and report on weapons of Iranian origin more thoroughly than weapons from other countries.
Most of the data on illicit weapons in
Also problematic is the fact that a large number of records containing US data on weapons seized in Afghanistan are redacted. The US Army does not explain why the records were singled out for redaction, and it is possible that data on certain types of weapons, weapons from certain countries, or weapons seized from specific end users was systematically withheld. The Australian Defence Force only includes weapons data that has been analysed by its Weapons
Intelligence Teams. Emplaced IEDs, unstable military ordnance, homemade explosives, small arms ammunition, and other weapons that are not routinely analysed by these teams are not included. Concerns about reporting biases and data gaps are allayed to some extent by the notable overlap between weapon models and countries of origin in data from different sources. 
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Despite the cited limitations, the data assembled for this study is significantly more detailed and complete than other open source data, most of which is aggregated by weapon type and lacks information on models and countries of origin. Thus, the data sheds new light on illicit weapons in conflict zones. It also underscores the importance of government transparency. The reluctance of governments to release detailed data on seized weapons hinders analysis by private researchers and inter-governmental bodies, such as the UN arms embargo monitoring groups. 8 The example set by the Australian, British, and US governments is worthy of emulation.
ILLICIT SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS IN IRAQ
This section is based on a review of the con- 
Overview of seized caches
The seized caches analysed for this study range in size from a few dozen rounds of rifle ammunition to several thousand weapons of various types and calibres. In all, more than 30,000 small arms, light weapons, and rounds of light weapons ammunition were recovered from the caches, along with more than 500,000 rounds of small-calibre ammunition. Approximately nine per cent of the seized weapons are identified by country of origin, representing at least 19 countries, with five accounting for most of these weapons (see Table 10 .2). for determining the age range of seized weapons generally, the data is germane to the highly contentious issue of Iranian weapons acquired and used by armed groups in Iraq. According to the data, at least 29 per cent of the more than 900 seized weapons reportedly of Iranian origin were manufactured since 2003, and most were less than two years old when they were seized.
Assuming that the US assessment of the weapons' provenance is accurate, the data reveals the presence of a robust supply chain feeding weapons into Iraq. Whether this chain is linked to the Iranian government is unclear.
Proving the existence of such linkages is extremely difficult, and even the best open source data rarely reveals the proximate source, let alone whether the shipments had the imprimatur of the Iranian government. Yet, if the Iranian government did not approve these transfers, they certainly entailed a surprisingly rapid diversion of often newly manufactured weapons from Iranian production or storage facilities, signalling a clear need for the review and strengthening of stockpile security practices in Iran.
The records on the seized caches also contain new information on the condition, or serviceability, of nearly 4,500 of the seized weapons. The data suggests that serviceability varies significantly from cache to cache. Some of the weapons are described as 'brand new' and were found in their original packaging. Other weapons, particularly those found underground, were highly corroded. The vast majority of weapons described as 'unserviceable' were mortar rounds, most of which were found in three large caches.
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The contents of seized caches were not limited to small arms and light weapons. The methods of storing and concealing caches are equally varied. Some were packed into 55-gallon drums and buried in fields or courtyards or under buildings. Others were hidden in houses and apartment buildings, sometimes under floorboards or behind walls. While searching the home of an individual accused of sectarian killings, US troops found two explosively formed penetrators in the false roof of a shower. Some of the seized caches were so well hidden or randomly placed that, without local assistance, US and Iraqi troops would not have found them. A good example is a cache of 9 mm ammunition and IED components hidden in a bag on the top of a broken elevator at the Kadamiyah hospital. Tips from local citizens were by far the most commonly cited way in which the caches reviewed for this study were found.
Small arms
Illicit small arms recovered in Iraq range from run-of-the-mill Kalashnikov-pattern assault rifles to flintlock pistols.
Among the more exotic weapons found by US troops are World War II-era German rifles etched with Nazi swastikas, gold-plated AKM rifles, and a four-barrel 'duck's foot' pistol used by sea captains against a first wave of ship-boarding The data reveals little about handguns recovered from the seized caches, except that they are widespread and are mostly 9 mm pistols. This is consistent with information provided by the Olive Group, which claims that pistols are in high demand in Iraq. 15 The Olive Group identified six models that are commonly found in Iraq, five of which are 9 mm pistols. 16 The 2008-09 cache data also provides little information about the sniper rifles recovered from the caches. Dragunov rifles are mentioned most frequently, but most of the approximately 90 seized sniper rifles are not identified by type or country of origin, precluding meaningful analysis of illicit sniper rifles in Iraq.
Light weapons 17
The following section summarizes and analyses data on nearly 27,000 light weapons and ammunition seized from arms caches in 2008 and 2009. As it is beyond the scope of this study to explore all light weapons, the section focuses on the three categories for which the most detailed data was obtained: RPGs and launchers, shoulder-fired rockets and launchers, and portable missile systems.
Rocket -propelled grenades and shoulder -fired rockets
More than 2,200 RPGs and 410 RPG launchers were recovered from the seized caches. 18 The majority of the items for which detailed information was available appear to be Soviet-designed models first fielded in the 1960s and 1970s; 
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fied by model appear to be older Soviet and Chinese-designed models that are of limited utility against modern tank armour but can still be deadly when used against personnel and unprotected or lightly protected vehicles.
The US Army's assessments of weapons found in Iraq in 2004 provide a detailed overview of RPG rounds.
According to the Small Arms Handbook, the RPG-7 was 'the primary portable rocket launcher in use by the insurgency' (NGIC, 2004a, p. 59) . A version of the RPG-7, the Al-Nassira, was produced in Iraq under Saddam Hussein's regime.
The RPG-16, a close cousin of the RPG-7 used by Russian airborne units, was also reportedly available, as were the RPG-18 and the RPG-22, which differ from the RPG-7 in that they are fired from single-shot, disposable launchers (NGIC, 2004a, pp. 58, 67) . Smaller numbers of other rocket launchers were also reportedly available. The most notable is the Armbrust, a single-shot, disposable rocket manufactured in Singapore and Germany. The Armbrust is potentially attractive to armed groups because it is stealthy, versatile, and less likely to attract counter-fire than the RPG-7. It has no backblast, so it can be fired from enclosed spaces, has no firing signature, and is 'quieter than a pistol shot', according to the US Army (NGIC, 2004a, pp. 73-74; Jones and Ness, 2007, pp. 487-88) .
RPG-7 launchers and their foreign variants fire a variety of rounds. The two main types are anti-personnel rounds and high-explosive, anti-tank (HEAT) rounds. Anti-tank rounds are further divided into models with one (unitary) warhead and those with two (tandem) warheads, the latter being much more effective against modern vehicle armour. While RPG-29s are not identified in the caches studied, armed groups in Iraq have acquired an unknown but presumably small number of them, 25 of which one was used to disable a British Challenger tank (Fox and Sheikhly, 2007; Rayment, 2007) . Several videos of purported RPG-29 attacks on US tanks have also been posted on file-sharing websites (LiveLeak, n.d.). The US military claims that Iran is probably the source of the RPG-29s (AFP, 2006), which were reportedly distributed in limited quantities and 'appear to have been used in a "trial" capacity', according to the Olive Group. 26 The absence of references to RPG-29 rounds (PG-29V) in the seized caches is consistent with claims that distribution of this weapon was extremely limited.
Data on RPG attacks compiled by the US Defense Manpower Data Center indicates that they were significantly less effective than attacks with other weapons. The data reveals that RPGs were responsible for 53 deaths and 773 injuries in Iraq from 2003 through early 2012, a tiny fraction of the 35,000 deaths and injuries 27 resulting from hostile events documented during this time period. In contrast, 'explosive devices'-presumed to include IEDs-reportedly killed nearly 2,200 people and injured more than 21,000 during this period. RPG attacks also inflicted fewer casualties than firearms and indirect fire 28 (DMDC, 2012) . It is unclear whether poor tactics, obsolete technology, or a combination of both accounts for the comparative ineffectiveness of RPG attacks in Iraq, but ready access to more effective anti-tank rockets almost certainly would have resulted in more casualties.
Although the percentage of seized RPG rounds identified by country of origin is relatively small, the data sheds some light on this issue. Of the roughly 2,200 RPG rounds found in the seized caches, 525 are identified by country of manufacture. Bulgaria and the Soviet Union are the most common sources, followed by Iran, China, the Russian Federation, and Iraq. ILLICIT SMALL ARMS 327 by model. 29 The remaining item was an SK-10 launcher (gripstock), which is part of the Chinese QW-1 MANPADS. (Baker, 2007) , and the Misagh-1 (Fox and Sheikhly, 2007) , which is reportedly a variant of the Chinese QW-1 produced in Iran. Two of these models-the SA-7 and the SA-14-were found in the seized caches studied. While estimates of Iraq's pre-war MANPADS inventory are imprecise, available information suggests that the regime stockpiled far fewer SA-14s and SA-16s than SA-7s, which may explain why far fewer of these systems have been found in seized arms caches (SIPRI, n.d.). The Misagh-1 has also been found in much smaller quantities (Schroeder, 2008) .
The US military report on the seized SK-10 launcher is among the most notable documents obtained as part of this study (US CENTCOM, 2011a) . The associated QW-1 MANPADS is a second-generation system first unveiled in 1994. It is faster, has a longer range, and is able to engage targets at higher altitudes than the other MANPADS recovered from the caches; moreover, it is 'all aspect', meaning that it can engage targets from any direction (O'Halloran and Foss, 2010, pp. 9, 39) . The report contains a photograph of the seized launcher-the first publicly available hard evidence of a QW series MANPADS in Iraq. 30 The photograph is a significant contribution to the ongoing debate over Iranian-supplied weapons in Iraq. Iran is a major importer of Chinese weapons and is believed to produce a copy of the QW-1 called the Misagh-1 (SIPRI, n.d.). 31 According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Iran produced an estimated 1,100
Misagh-1 MANPADS in 1996-2006 (SIPRI, n.d.). The US military claims that Iran has provided Misagh-1 missiles to armed groups in Iraq but has offered little hard evidence to support this claim (Fox and Sheikhly, 2007) . Information from other sources is scant. The most significant is an amateur video of what appears to be a Misagh-1 attack perpetrated by members of Kata'ib Hizballah, an armed group in Iraq with alleged ties to Iran (Schroeder, 2010) . While impossible to authenticate, the video was the strongest publicly available evidence of Chinese-designed MANPADS in Iraq until the release of the report on the seized SK-10 gripstock.
There is some circumstantial evidence linking Iran to the launcher, including the cache in which it was found. In addition to the launcher, the cache reportedly contained nine blocks of Iranian C4 explosives and four recently manufactured Iranian RPG rounds (US CENTCOM, 2011a) . Conclusively linking the launcher to Iran is difficult, however.
There are other potential sources of QW-1 missiles, and it is unclear whether Iran imported any gripstocks directly from China or if its own gripstocks are marked with the same designations. Answers to these questions are necessary, but not sufficient, for linking the Iranian government to the gripstock, which may have made its way to Iraq through (AP, 2005) . Some sources contend that Iraqi insurgents continue to obtain arms through the channels that Saddam Hussein utilized to bypass the arms embargo, some of which go through Syria and involve the provision of false end-user certificates (Intelligence Online, 2004) . Nonetheless, there is little open source evidence indicating that the Syrian government is directly involved in trafficking.
In addition to cross-border trafficking, many arms transfers occur within Iraq. Former soldiers have sold some of the weapons that now circulate illicitly in Iraq. Recent reports also indicate that members of the reconstituted Iraqi army and police have sold their weapons on the black market, including those procured with US government funding. In 2006, C.J. Chivers of The New York Times wrote that, among the 370,000 weapons purchased by the United States for Iraq's security forces, three of the principal types could readily be found in Iraqi shops and bazaars (Chivers, 2006) . In 2007, arms dealers reportedly told Reuters that many Iraqi soldiers and policemen were selling their pistols on the black market. In the same report, an Iraqi soldier explained that this decision was motivated by the need to 'feed my family until I find a safer job' (Rasheed and Colvin, 2007) . Data on the pistols seized from insurgent caches in 2008-09 is too vague to assess these claims.
Open source reports indicate that international and Iraq-based traffickers utilize a variety of routes. In their paper, Iranian Strategy in Iraq, Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman describe several common routes for smuggling arms from Iran into Iraq, stating that traffickers often receive shipments of explosively formed penetrators from Iran through Amara, Basra, and Diwaniyah, transfer them to Sadr City, and then distribute them to Special Groups in outlying provinces (Felter and Fishman, 2008) . Militants mention the marshy areas next to the Iraqi border town of Qal'at Sali as a common trafficking route for small boats carrying illicit weapons. Traffickers have also been detained in the village of Qasarin near the border with Iran (AP, 2007) . Media reports mention several popular locations for selling illicit arms inside Iraq, including the Meridi market in Sadr City and the arms bazaars in Amara (Hasni, 2003; Sherwell, 2004) .
When trafficking weapons, smugglers and insurgents utilize a variety of transportation and concealment methods. US intelligence reports and interviews with Iraqi gun -runners reveal that weapons are smuggled in trucks hauling cigarettes, sheep, cement, crates of fruit, or propane gas cylinders. Other shipments are carried by boat via the marshes of Qal'at Sali (Felter and Fishman, 2008) . Smugglers unload the boats at various points along the shoreline and place the weapons in the beds of pickup trucks, covering them with reeds. Many smugglers use local dirt roads to evade checkpoints manned by coalition forces. A 2004 interview with an Iraqi arms trafficker illustrates the precision and planning that characterizes many smuggling efforts:
Travelling with fake documents, he is guided by spotters who drive ahead in cars and check with street observers who advise them on which routes are guarded and where diversions are needed [. . .] . Once in Baghdad, the gun runners offload the lorries and distribute the arms in cars or minibuses, relying on the laxness of the Iraqi police to see them through (Hider, 2004) .
US Marines claim that Sunni insurgents who traffic arms and fighters into Fallujah have used ambulances and aid trucks to transport weapons between neighbourhoods (Navarro, 2004) . US marines have, in fact, found false bottoms in vehicles filled with assault rifles and RPG launchers as well as an anti-aircraft gun hidden in a truckload of aid (IWPR, 2005) . In April 2008, Iraqi policemen identified an abandoned truck stacked with hay that had been transporting arms through the area. The shipment was reportedly 'moved up the al-Kut highway to be broken down into smaller packages for movement to Baghdad' (Sowers, 2008) . however, the number of missiles seized per cache had dropped significantly; none of the caches studied contained more than two missiles identified as MANPADS. It is possible that larger caches were found and not reported, but there is little evidence of a shift in reporting practices from previous years. The most likely explanation is that insurgent usage, buy-back programmes, and cache seizures have reduced the number of illicit MANPADS available in Iraq to levels more consistent with other war zones.
Finally, the data provides a rare, if limited, glimpse at the age and serviceability of illicit MANPADS in Iraq. Documents obtained from the US government contain photos of the markings on seized MANPADS, few of which are publicly available (see Image 10.4) . The markings on one of the seized missiles indicates that it is a Soviet SA-7b manufactured in 1978, which suggests it is one of the thousands looted from Iraqi stockpiles in 2003. According to SIPRI, the Iraqi government imported 6,500 SA-7 missiles from 1975 to 1986, placing the manufacture of the photographed missile within the delivery timeframe (SIPRI, n.d.). The date is important in determining whether the missile and others like it are operational. Since the reported shelf life of most MANPADS is roughly 10-20 years (Schroeder, 2011; Hunter, 2001) , it is possible that the missile was either no longer operational or would not have performed as intended. On the other hand, the documents also highlight the danger of assuming that MANPADS are unserviceable simply because they are first-generation systems. Documents obtained from the US military contain serviceability assessments for five of the seized MANPADS. Explosive ordnance disposal experts deemed three of the five missiles 'serviceable'. While this sample size is too small to extrapolate to the broader population of illicit MANPADS in Iraq, the documents do raise the possibility that at least some of the loose SA-7 MANPADS are operational despite their advanced age. 
IllIcIt small arms and lIght weapons In afghanIstan
This section is based on a review of three previously unreleased datasets. They contain: [that] appears to be focused on children or young adults' (US ARCENT, 2011).
Small arms
The data on seized caches includes records of 217 firearms recovered by the US military and an additional 169 firearms seized by the Australian Defence Force and the British military (see Table 10 .6). The seized weapons range from early 20 th -century Lee-Enfield rifles to an AKM assault rifle 'never before fired' and still covered in packing grease.
As in Iraq, several novelty firearms were also found, including a musket, a pen gun, and a World War-II-era M3 submachine gun. The caches contained few surprises; nearly all of the types and models of seized firearms have been available in Afghanistan for many years and have been documented elsewhere (Bhatia and Sedra, 2008, pp. 65-66; Chivers, 2011) .
Rifles accounted for more than half of all seized firearms, with Kalashnikov-pattern assault rifles being the most numerous. A smaller but still significant number of bolt-action rifles were also found in the caches; most of them appear to be chambered for the .303 round used by various iterations of the British Lee-Enfield rifle, which was first produced more than a century ago. This mix of seized rifles documented by the United States is roughly the same as that documented by Australia and is consistent with accounts from journalists (Chivers, 2011) .
The large number of .303 bolt-action rifles is a departure from caches found in Iraq and merits closer attention copies (Chivers, 2011) .
Despite their apparent ubiquity, .303 bolt-action rifles are not widely used by armed groups in Afghanistan, according to Chivers. He speculates that a lack of ammunition may be a major reason (Chivers, 2011) , a theory that is supported by caches studied in this analysis. Of the tens of thousands of rounds of small-calibre ammunition found in the seized caches, only one 'bag' of ammunition for .303 calibre bolt-action rifles was identified.
Most of the machine guns seized in the caches are widely exported models of Soviet design. More than half are PKMs, which are among the most widely exported machine guns in the world. (Bhatia and Sedra, 2008, p. 65) and recent on-the-ground cataloguing of seized caches (Chivers, 2009; .
As in Iraq, very few US-and European-designed rifles and machine guns are listed in the contents of the seized caches. It is possible that some of the firearms not identified by type are of Western origin, but even if half of the unidentified firearms were manufactured in the United States or Europe-which is unlikely-they would still only constitute a small share of seized firearms. Furthermore, only a small percentage of the ammunition recovered from the seized caches were 5.56 mm rounds used in most US and Western European rifles. Of the 283 identifiable ammunition magazines found in the caches, only four were identified for M4 and M16 rifles. 34 The data reveals little about the security of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) inventories. Most of the firearms in ANSF arsenals are Kalashnikov-pattern assault rifles and PK series machine guns-the same types of firearms used by insurgents (Jane's World Armies, 2012). 35 The media regularly produce accounts of weapons that were issued to Afghan soldiers or police officers and subsequently seized from insurgents or recovered from arms caches. Among the more compelling examples is Chivers' analysis of 30 seized Kalashnikov magazines, which finds that 'at least 17 of the magazines contained ammunition identical to the cartridges issued by the United States to Afghan government forces' (Chivers, 2010) . 36 Whether this account is representative of insurgent holdings more generally is difficult to determine, however, since little aggregate data on seized ANSF weapons has been made public.
Light weapons
Despite persistent concerns about the acquisition of new, deadly weapons by the Taliban (Danahar, 2007; Vanden Brook, 2008) , an analysis of the seized caches and other reports suggest that most illicit light weapons in Afghanistan are primarily older models that have been available in Afghanistan for decades. While they still pose a threat, few, if any, of the Taliban's weapons appear to be technologically sophisticated game-changers comparable to the Stinger missiles acquired by their predecessors in the 1980s.
Data on light weapons recovered from the seized caches that were studied suggests that many are early generation systems of Chinese, Russian, or Soviet design. Of the more than 1,100 light weapons found in the caches that are identified by country of manufacture, almost 90 per cent are identified as Chinese, Russian, or Soviet. Many of these systems were first fielded in the 1960s or early 1970s. For example, most of the models of seized RPG launchers and rounds identified in the data were fielded at least 40 years ago, 37 and several dozen of the rounds were developed in the 1950s. As in Iraq, no tandem warhead or thermobaric rounds are listed.
Furthermore, literature on previous conflicts in Afghanistan suggests that the models of RPGs-and most of the other seized light weapons-were first introduced in the country many decades ago. The United States and its allies supplied thousands of Chinese and Soviet weapons of various models to the Mujahideen in the 1980s (Bhatia and Sedra, 2008, p. 44) . Many of the same models have been recovered from the seized caches. Thousands more weapons were acquired from the Soviet-backed regime, either on the battlefield or from government depots when the regime collapsed in 1992 (p. 49). Whether the recently seized weapons themselves date back that far is not clear, 
Box 10.2 Trafficking in small arms and light weapons in Afghanistan
Illicit small arms and light weapons in Afghanistan are legacies of decades of international and regional conflict. With thousands of small arms and light weapons left over from the Soviet invasion and the ongoing conflict, civilians and insurgent groups within Afghanistan have easy access to unregulated arms. Nonetheless, weapons left over from previous conflicts are not the only illicit arms. Weapons continue to flow across Afghanistan's porous borders and particularly across the borders with Iran, Pakistan, and Tajikistan. This box assesses the regional sources of illicit arms in Afghanistan as well as the routes and methods used by smugglers. Reports of weapons intercepted along Afghanistan's border with Pakistan as well as interviews with arms dealers underscore the importance of the trade in the mountainous frontier region. For example, in 2005, the Afghan Defence Ministry reported 475 seizures of weapons, including more than 2,000 rockets, 4,000 land mines, and 5 million cartridges on the border with Pakistan, some of which reportedly belonged to former Taliban and al Qaeda fighters currently stationed in Pakistan (IWPR, 2005) . Similarly, in January 2007, Afghan forces found 40 truckloads of machine guns, explosives, and rockets belonging to the Taliban that were hidden in mountain caves near the border with Pakistan (Khost, 2007) .
Arms are also trafficked across the border with Tajikistan, to the north. There are multiple documented reports of arms caches found along the border, and arms dealers have described the region as a prime smuggling route during media interviews (Starkey, 2008) . Weapons seized along the border include Kalashnikov-pattern rifles, small arms ammunition, and hand grenades reportedly abandoned by Afghan smugglers in Tajikistan's Moskovskiy district in March 2001 (ITAR-TASS, 2001 ). Media interviews with arms smugglers in 2008 indicate that Russian arms dealers and Taliban drug lords often utilize this border to exchange Russian arms for Afghan opium (Starkey, 2008) .
Possible arms trafficking across the border with Iran receives significantly more attention than trafficking at other points along the Afghan border. Many US and Afghan officials believe that the Iranian government is at least turning a blind eye to activities of certain armed groups. 38 Part of this suspicion stems from the March 2011 seizure of 48 122 mm Iranian-produced rockets by British troops in Nimruz Province (Borger and Norton-Taylor, 2011) . Similar incidents include the reported capture of Iranian arms traffickers in October 2009 and the seizure of a large shipment of anti-tank mines and mortars crossing from Iran into Afghanistan in June 2009 (AP, 2010; Parks, n.d.) . Corroborating claims that the Iranian government is involved in such incidents using open source data is extremely difficult, however, and even the US military concedes that groups other than those directly affiliated with the Iranian government may be responsible for at least some of the arms trafficking. For example, the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) suggests that Baluchi insurgents (instead of Iranian intelligence or al-Quds) may be the ones transferring many of the Iranian weapons (Parks, n.d.) .
The routes used by traffickers are many and varied. Some common routes from Afghanistan to Pakistan run through the Logar and Wardak Provinces of Afghanistan to border towns of Pakistan such as Bannu, Miranshah, and Wana (IWPR, 2005) . While there is little publicly available data on the precise locations of trafficking from Tajikistan, an Afghan police commander claims that smugglers use the Darqad Pass between Tajikistan and the northern Afghan province of Takhar (Jalalzai, 2011) . Furthermore, during media interviews, arms smugglers have claimed that Russian arms dealers meet Taliban drug lords to make exchanges at a bazaar near the old Afghan-Soviet border, deep in Tajikistan's desert, and then transport the arms from Tajikistan towards conflict areas in Afghanistan. According to JIEDDO, many of the arms trafficked between Afghanistan and Iran go through the Afghan border town of Islam Qala, on the road between Herat and Mashhad, Iran. The British Sunday Times asserts that much of the trafficking through Islam Qala is conducted by a drug trafficker in southern Afghanistan who is believed to have bought weapons from the Iranian government and sold them to the Taliban .
Smugglers and insurgents utilize a variety of methods for transporting and concealing weapons. Arms are often trafficked in cars, in trucks, and on the backs of donkeys and horses. For example, in March 2006, Afghan highway police stopped a Toyota Corolla loaded with Kalashnikov-pattern rifles reportedly destined for the Taliban (IWPR, 2006) . In January 2003, Afghan authorities seized weapons being carted over the Pakistan border on donkeys and horses near the city of Jalalabad (News Wire Services, 2003) . As navigating the mountainous terrain of Afghanistan's borders can be daunting, smugglers sometimes use a guide who specializes in wilderness border crossings (JIEDDO, n.d.) . Traffickers often conceal their weapons with building materials, agricultural produce, livestock, flour sacks, cigarettes, and cement (Hussain and Hayadat, 2011; Parks, n.d.; Moscow Interfax, 1998) . In 1998, the Kyrgyz security service detained 16 railroad cars carrying weapons from Iran to Afghanistan disguised as sacks of flour provided as humanitarian aid (Moscow Interfax, 1998) . Sometimes, guns are disassembled to facilitate transport (Starkey, 2008) . Smugglers have also been known to disguise themselves as cloth traders, labourers, humanitarian aid workers, and police. An official from the Afghan interior ministry stated that police vehicles are sometimes used in narcotics and weapons smuggling (Jalalzai, 2011). during an engagement with the Taliban in August 2008 (Flade, 2010 As evidenced by the data on the seized caches, the number and types of modern, technologically sophisticated light weapons accessible to armed groups in Afghanistan appear to be very limited. The constraining effect on Taliban operations is most clearly evident in the number of aircraft shot down in Afghanistan. The US has lost 17 helicopters to hostile fire in ten years (Peter, 2011 ) -a small number compared to the 270 Soviet aircraft shot down by Afghan armed groups in the late 1980s (Kuperman, 1999) . While training and tactics partially explain this difference, the weapons themselves-and the US military's familiarity with them-undoubtedly have played a major role.
The Stinger, which the Mujahideen never would have obtained without US assistance, was latest-generation technology that the Soviets were initially incapable of countering (Schroeder, Stohl, and Smith, 2007, pp. 84-85) . In response to the political instability that has defined Somalia since the ousting of President Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991, the UN Security Council has maintained an arms embargo on the country (UNSC, 1992a; 1992b; 2002a; 2008b) . UN Security Council Resolution 733, adopted in January 1992, decreed 'a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia until the Council decides otherwise' (UNSC, 1992a, para 5). The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) formed in 2004 as a result of internationally sponsored peace talks (Menkhaus, 2010, p. S331) . The TFG has received greater international support than previous transitional governments since the Barre era (Bryden and Brickhill, 2010, p. 259) . Beginning in 2007, in an effort to bolster the TFG, the UN arms embargo was amended to include exemptions for weapons and training destined for the fledgling authority 43 and the punishment of countries seeking to destabilize or overthrow it (Wezeman, 2010, p. 2) . 44 Requests for embargo exemptions in support of the TFG are submitted to the sanctions committee and are not made public. 45 As a result, a comprehensive list of countries that have supplied the TFG armed forces is not available. In 2005 and 2006, prior to the adoption of Resolution 1744, both Ethiopia and Yemen reportedly supplied arms to the TFG armed forces. 46 The United States received committee authorization in 2009 to supply the TFG armed forces with weapons and ammunition that were largely acquired from Ugandan stocks (UNSC, 2010, p. 54) .
The UNSEMG distinguishes two kinds of embargo violations: 'technical' violations, which support the TFG but are not approved in advance by the sanctions committee, and 'substantive' violations, which would not have qualified for an exemption (UNSC, 2011, p. 41) . Since 2007, the UNSEMG has denounced several states for their failure to receive prior approval before supplying military equipment or training to the TFG police and military forces. They include Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Uganda, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Yemen (UNSC, 2008a, pp. 23-24; 2010, pp. 55-56) . While no action was taken in these cases, the Security Council imposed an arms embargo on Eritrea in 2009, largely in response to that country's support for armed opposition groups in Somalia (UNSC, 2009).
al Shabaab along the Kenya-Somalia border, while Ethiopian forces moved farther into the southern regions of the ailing state through the end of 2011. 48 
Small arms
Illicit small arms in Somalia are similar to those in Iraq and Afghanistan in that most are variants of widely exported Soviet-designed assault rifles and machine guns. Kalashnikov-pattern assault rifles are by far the most numerous types of assault rifles, while the PKM and DShK have near complete monopolies on the light and heavy machine gun markets, respectively. Combined, these three types of firearms account for 92 per cent of all firearms recorded in the UNSEMG reports (see Table 10 .7).
Kalashnikov-pattern assault rifles are the most common firearms found throughout the country, with 28,695 cases of illicit transfer or seizure recorded by the UNSEMG during the period studied (October 2005 -December 2008 . In fact, the UNSEMG reports identify 93.2 per cent of all assault rifles as 'AK-47s', combining different generations of Kalashnikov-pattern assault rifles, including non-Soviet variants, under this heading. The reports identify other types of assault rifles in Somalia but in much smaller quantities. These are: the German-designed G3 (and G3A3), the Belgian FAL, the US M16, and the Singa porean SR-88. Together, these models represent less than 7 per cent of all illicit assault rifles documented in the UNSEMG reports. Moreover, according to one panel member, these weapons are becoming increasingly scarce as their ammunition becomes less available. 49 As previously mentioned, the UNSEMG reports contain very little information on the country of manufacture, age, or condition of the illicit weapons that they document.
However, anecdotal accounts from other sources provide some insight into these characteristics. For instance, investigations conducted by journalists into the Bakaara arms market, the most notorious arms market in Somalia, have revealed the presence of Kalashnikov-pattern rifles from Bulgaria, China, India, North Korea, the former Soviet Union, and Ukraine (Coker, 2001; Sheikh, 2009 ). The Chinese Type 56 is believed to be the most common version in service, probably in part due to its lower cost, which can be less than a third that of a Russian AKM (UNSC, 2010, p. 74). (Jane's SSA, 2010) . As the Barre regime collapsed, so did controls over government stockpiles, leading to massive looting (Forberg and Terlinden, 1999, p. 26) . Newer Kalashnikov variants are also in circulation, however.
Production years for many of the Chinese Type 56 reported in Somalia, for instance, range from 1976 to 1991 (UNSC, 2011, p. 37) , but newer models of this firearm, from 2007, clearly shipped to Somalia post arms embargo, are also circulating (UNSC, 2008a, p. 37).
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With one exception, Soviet-designed machine guns are the only versions reported by the UNSEMG. Machine guns are reported almost as frequently as Kalashnikov-pattern rifles in transfers and seizures, although overall quantities were lower. The Soviet-designed PK series is the most frequently mentioned type of machine gun in the dataset and the second-most cited weapon (3,754 recorded). Although foreign variants of the PK are manufactured, the UNSEMG's reports mention only the Russian-built PKMs. The other Soviet-designed machine guns reported by UN monitors were the RPD and SG-43. The only Western-designed machine gun was a single US Browning .30 calibre.
Likewise, the Russian-built 12.7mm DShK was the only heavy machine gun identified. Given their size, DShKs are often mounted on vehicles known as 'technicals' (Somaiya, 2010) . The term 'technical' in Somalia also applies to vehicles mounted with recoilless rifles, such as the B-10, and larger anti-aircraft cannon, such as the 23mm ZU-23.
Technicals are common in Somalia; their role in both providing heavy fire and transporting troops was recorded in the 1990s (Guled, 1996) . More recently, they have been utilized in many major battles, including the ICU capture of Mogadishu in 2006 52 and fighting against Kenyan troops in 2011. 53 An analysis of the UNSEMG data reveals several patterns. Transfers and seizures typically consist of a large number of Kalashnikov-pattern rifles, a few PKMs, two or three DShK machine guns, and one or two other types of light weapons, often RPGs. This lack of diversity has logistical benefits in that the same or closely related weapons use the same type of ammunition and parts. The fact that TFG and AMISOM forces also use many of the same types of weapons has made them another potential source of arms and ammunition. As described below, there is growing evidence that weapons and ammunition supplied by AMISOM to the TFG armed forces and its affiliated militias, such as ASWJ, are finding their way into arms markets and the hands of al Shabaab. 54 
Light weapons
According to UNSEMG reports, the only large conventional weapons 55 available to Somali armed groups are anti-aircraft cannon and artillery shells. While these weapons fall outside of the scope of this study, it is worth noting that al Shabaab is converting large-calibre artillery shells-155 mm for instance-into IEDs, giving them one of their most effective weapons against heavy armour (VOA News, 2011). Recent media reports on cache seizures indicate that large-calibre artillery shells are still numerous in the country and will probably continue to threaten the TFG and AMISOM. 56 Illicit light weapons currently circulating in Somalia appear to consist primarily of older model anti-tank weapons, grenades, mines, and mortars, along with a few surface-to-air and anti-tank missiles.
Guided light weapons systems
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Somali government imported a number of missile systems that, at the time, were relatively advanced. These included Soviet (SA-7b Strela) and US (FIM-43C Redeye) MANPADS as well as ATGWs, such as the French MILAN and Soviet AT-3 Sagger (SIPRI, n.d. Although opposition forces appear to possess some advanced weaponry, its overall impact appears to be minimal.
In 2007, there were two confirmed MANPADS attacks (one successful, one not) and a third attack that was claimed but not confirmed (UNSC, 2011, p. 241) . In 2010, the UNSEMG reported seeing a small number of wire-guided antitank weapons in the possession of armed opposition forces (UNSC, 2010, p. 6) , but the only confirmed usage of an anti-tank guided missile occurred in 2010, when a Soviet designed AT-7 Saxhorn was fired at AMISOM troops (UNSC, 2010, p. 48) . While the origins of the AT-7 are unclear, it seems unlikely that it was part of the Barre regime's stocks since the weapon did not enter into service until 1979, two years after Somalia stopped receiving support from the Soviet Union. 63 
Grenades
The UNSEMG reported the transfer and seizure of 6,570 hand grenades during the period under review (see Table   10 .8), with the Soviet-designed F1 being the only model named in the reports. The F1, the first generation of which was designed in WWII, is an anti-personnel hand grenade that has been widely produced and deployed (Jones and Ness, 2007, p. 788 
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Anti -vehicle weapons
The UNSEMG reports indicate that RPGs, and specifically the RPG-2 and RPG-7, are the most common anti-tank weapons in circulation in Somalia. RPG launchers and ammunition present in Somalia have been attributed to Bulgarian, Chinese, and Russian manufacturers (UNSC, 2010, p. 75) .
A range of RPG rounds is available in Somalia; the HEAT type PG-7V, PG-7VL, and PG-7VM are the models most frequently encountered by UN monitors (UNSC, 2010, p. 75 Note: *Dashes indicate that although the weapons were reported, the quantities were not specified.
Sources: UNSC (2005; 2008a; 2008c) , 2011, pp. 36-37) .
Firing an 82 mm cartridge (Hogg, 1989, p. 414) , the Soviet-designed B-10 recoilless rifle is one of the largest anti-vehicle weapons frequently listed in the UNSEMG reports.
Originally fitted on wheels for easier transport, the B-10 was designed to fire off a tripod for increased manoeuvrability (Hogg, 1989, p. 414) . Videos of recoilless rifles in use in Somalia, however, suggest that other models of this weapon type are also available.
Several videos show Somali fighters firing
what are described as B-10s from the shoulder of a single shooter. 65 Given that 
Weapons circulation
Unlike the data on illicit weapons in Iraq and Afghanistan, which reveals little about how and when the weapons were acquired, the UNSEMG reports often contain detailed information on the movement of illicit weapons into and within Somalia. In some cases, information on the source country, the intermediaries involved in the transfer, the route to and within Somalia, and the eventual end user are reported. It is important to note that not all of these transfers were state-sponsored, but were, instead, reported simply as countries of origin.
Boats, or dhows, were the most frequent modes of transportation for imports from the primary source countries.
Imports from Yemen mostly arrived via sea. The majority of items arriving by air typically originated in or arrived from Eritrea, though some also arrived by sea. Imports from Ethiopia, by contrast, were sent via land routes along its long shared border with Somalia.
As illustrated by data compiled from the UNSEMG reports, weapons enter Somalia throughout the entire country ern Somalia has become a major entry point for weapons destined for opposition groups (UNSC, 2010, p. 48) . Most imports from Yemen arrived in the Puntland region, particularly the port of Bosaso, and northern Somali coastline towns, such as Haradheere. According to the UNSEMG, the route through Puntland remains the 'primary gateway for arms and ammunition into Somalia' (UNSC, 2010, p. 49) . Most shipments from Ethiopia were sent to interior provinces in central Somalia and southern Puntland. 68 Arms shipments do not necessarily stay at their first destination in Somalia. Many make their way to Mogadishu.
For example, it appears numerous weapons originally shipped to Bosaso, Galkayo, Garowe, and other towns in the Puntland region were eventually retransferred to Mogadishu or farther south. there is no hard evidence that Eritrea has directly supplied any arms in recent years, 69 although it maintains financial support to al Shabaab (UNSC, 2010, p. 47) . In November 2011, Kenyan and Somali officials accused Eritrea of sending several arms shipments to al Shabaab through the town of Baidoa (Teyie and Wabala, 2011) . These reports were not verified by the UNSEMG (BBC News, 2011a) and, in fact, the UNSEMG's preliminary findings, released in January 2012, indicate that the accusations 'were incorrect' (Maasho, 2012) . The UN Security Council nevertheless imposed stronger sanctions on Eritrea in December 2011 for continuing to support al Shabaab (Reuters, 2011) .
The UNSEMG has alleged that the more advanced guided weapons systems documented in the UN reports have Table 10 .10).
The UNSEMG reports document weapons entering from Ethiopia largely for the benefit of the state authorities in Somalia and Puntland, as well as allied armed groups, such as ASWJ (UNSC, 2010, p. 48) . Although conducted in support of the TFG, the transfers documented by UN monitors were all considered 'technical violations' of the embargo as they were made either prior to Resoultion 1744 or subsequently without the consent of the sanctions committee (UNSC, 2010, p. 47) .
Reports by the UNSEMG also indicate that Ethiopia sent arms into Somalia to support the operations of its own troops or the TFG armed forces and its allies. Resupplying efforts to either Ethiopian troops or the TFG armed forces accounted for 40 per cent of the total number of deliveries entering Somalia from Ethiopia. An additional nine per cent of the deliveries identified Puntland authorities as the end recipient. The UN monitors indicate that weapons (Small Arms Survey, 2010, p. 6 ).
Since the bulk of the reports in the database compiled for this study cover periods before the end of 2008, it is not possible to determine the impact this development has had on arms shipments to Somalia. Yet the 2011 UNSEMG report does note the continued predominance of Yemeni weapons in Somali markets (UNSC, 2011, p. 41) . There are also allegations of the diversion of official Yemeni arms to Somalia. According to Jane's Defence Weekly, poor stockpile management in Yemen is probably contributing a large portion of these supplies, with Yemeni military officials suspected of selling their own inventory (Knickmeyer, 2010) . The Yemeni government denies these claims (UNSC, 2011, p. 41) .
Leakage from weapons stockpiles in Somalia is another important source of weapons fuelling the country's illicit market. This involves the unauthorized sale of weapons and ammunition by individual officers or corrupt officials from the TFG or allied armed groups. Opposition forces also take weapons from seized state or African Union arms depots or from dead soldiers and police. Desertion and defection of TFG police and military are also a great concern, with a 2008 report suggesting an attrition rate of 80 per cent; when these trained security and defence forces leave their jobs, they take their weapons and uniforms with them (UNSC, 2008c, p. 12) . These weapons are often sold at arms markets.
A 2010 report by the UNSEMG indicates that this practice has probably increased since 2008. This is particularly true of ammunition (UNSC, 2011, p. 43) . The sale of ammunition has become a means for many TFG troops and ASWJ members to supplement their low salaries, according to UN monitors, and presents a difficult dilemma for countries wishing to support the TFG with military equipment, as they may inadvertently feed the illicit market. In a survey of ammunition available in the Bakaara arms market, eight of 11 rounds had markings consistent with AMISOM holdings (UNSC, 2011, p. 44) . It is estimated that government and pro-government forces typically sell between a third and a half of their ammunition (UNSC, 2011, p. 44). Without extensive government assistance, however, it is highly unlikely that the Mujahideen would have acquired
any Stinger missiles at all, let alone the large quantities and training necessary to disrupt Soviet air operations. UNITA was equally dependent on the United States for its Stingers. Thus, as illustrated by these cases, assistance from producing states is an essential factor in determining the speed and extent to which latest-generation portable missiles enter the black market.
With the possible exception of Iran, there is no compelling reason for the few producers and importers of latestgeneration MANPADS and ATGWs to supply them to armed groups in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Somalia, and the diplomatic consequences of doing so-deliberately or inadvertently-would be severe. Indeed, there is little substantiated evidence that any armed group has acquired latest-generation MANPADS-a testament to the growing awareness of the terrorist threat posed by these weapons and the effect of global efforts to address it.
It is less clear why armed groups have not acquired and used more third-generation portable missiles and advanced anti-tank rockets. These weapons are in the arsenals of many more countries than are latest-generation systems, including countries with poor stockpile and export controls and those accused of arming non-state groups.
One possible explanation is that less sophisticated but readily available weapons and ammunition were effective enough that it was not worth the cost and trouble of acquiring more sophisticated weapons from abroad. In Iraq, armed groups had access to thousands of tons of weapons looted from government depots in 2003. Large-calibre (Roane and Pound, 2004; O'Hanlon and Livingston, 2011, p. 8) . In Afghanistan, IED makers also use locally available components, including ammonium nitrate fertilizer produced in Pakistan and widely used by Afghan farmers. Journalist Greg Jaffe claims that these devices cost about USD 40 to make (PRI, 2011) ; along with other IEDs, they account for more than 60 per cent of US casualties in Afghanistan (DMDC, 2012) . In both theatres, IEDs appear to be an adequate substitute for advanced ATGWs and antivehicle rockets, which are almost certainly more expensive and difficult to obtain, particularly in the quantities necessary to sustain the high tempo of insurgent activity in Iraq and Afghanistan.
This explanation is less compelling with respect to MANPADS. While RPGs and firearms are sometimes used to shoot down helicopters, MANPADS are particularly well suited for use against military aircraft. MANPADS have a significantly longer effective range than RPGs and most firearms and, because they are guided, they are much more likely to hit their target. Given these attributes, and the heavy reliance of US and NATO troops on air operations during the time period studied, the apparent inability of armed groups in Afghanistan and Iraq to acquire third-generation MANPADS is more probably explained by supply-side dynamics than a lack of demand.
Another possible explanation is that the best-equipped armed groups are reliant on sympathetic governments for certain light weapons, and these governments are withholding (or limiting the number of) weapons viewed as particularly sensitive. There is evidence that state sponsors of armed groups in Iraq and Somalia have, at times, reduced the flow of weapons in response to international pressure. Whether this pressure has had a constraining effect on the quantities and types of portable missiles and other sensitive weapons provided by these governments is unclear, in part because of a lack of publicly available evidence conclusively linking individual illicit weapons to the governments accused of supplying them. More and better data on sanctions-defying arms shipments and weapons seized from arms caches would help to answer these questions.
Despite these gaps, the data has clear implications for policy-makers. The apparent absence of latest-generation MANPADS in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia strongly suggests that national and international initiatives to eliminate the illicit proliferation and use of these weapons are bearing fruit. Studying these initiatives-and identifying the most effective control strategies employed as part of these efforts-could yield important insight into controlling other latest-generation small arms and light weapons. Applying these lessons to the most sensitive weapons, including portable sensor-fused weapons, programmable ('smart') airburst grenades, and guided mortars, could significantly reduce the likelihood that they will end up in the wrong hands.
At the same time, the data also underscores the need to control the availability of early generation weapons. As evidenced by data on usage of illicit weapons in all three countries studied, even the simplest weapons can be extremely destructive when deployed in large numbers and innovative or tactically savvy ways. Of particular importance is the prevention of excessive stockpiling, which led to the accumulation of millions of tons of weapons and ammunition in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia. When the regimes controlling these stockpiles collapsed, the weapons quickly spread to the armed groups that filled the resulting power vacuum. These weapons were used extensively in the years following the looting, and data collected for this study suggest that at least some of these weapons remain in circulation today. Preventing similar stockpiling in countries prone to instability-and right-sizing existing (excessive) stockpiles-would help to limit the number of illicit weapons in current and future war zones. (2002b, p. 17) .
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Rockets fired from rails and used with improvised launchers are not included in the dataset because of the difficulty of separating rockets used in these capacities from other types of projectiles.
